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Abstract: 
Beginning in March, 2014, banners and signs have been spotted hanging at 
various North Korean military schools and training sites such as the Kang Kong 
Military Academy, embroiled with bold words denouncing the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) as “a turncoat and [North Korea’s] enemy”1.    While history has 
displayed cold and nonchalant instances in the Sino-North Korea relationship, its 
recent deterioration has become more prominent since the young Kim Jong-Un 
has ascended to his throne.  Global and public opinion has drawn similarity of 
Kim to a child defiant to the guidance of its parent – the PRC, which itself is no 
stranger to rebellious protégés.  Echoing the prelude to the Sino-Vietnam Conflict 
in 1979 when then-Chinese Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping declared China’s 
intention to “spank its naughty child”, the current Sino-North Korean relation 
although has yet to spiral down to such hostility, China has become increasingly 
more assertive in its denunciation of its misbehaving child.    
The PRC’s relationship with North Korea, also formally known as the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been, and will be, a chief 
element in influencing the regional politics of the Asia Pacific.  Any 
developments, whether positive or negative, can impact the long term dynamics of 
the region.  The centrepiece of this Capstone Paper will mainly explore the 
relationship between PRC and the DPRK under the leadership of Kim Jong-Un, 
with the following central question: how fragmented is the Sino-DPRK 
relationship under the current administrations and how is Beijing hedging against 
North Korea?  The hypothesis to the question is that the relationship between a 
                                                          
1 Zachary Keck, "North Korea Slams Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream," The Diplomat, last modified June 17, 2014, 
accessed May 27, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/north-korea-slams-xi-jinping-and-the-chinese-dream/. 
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modernized China and a rouge North Korea has begun to deteriorate especially 
after the first North Korean missile test and the rift between the two will continue 
to widen if Pyongyang does not heed Beijing’s advice seriously.  Though 
frustrated, China nonetheless will not cease its relation with the DPRK as it still 
needs the buffer zone between them and a US allied South Korea.  In assessing the 
question, the framework of this Capstone Project will be structured with the 
evaluation of the bilateral relationship using three crucial events (“Red Flags”) that 
happened during the young dictator’s tenure.  Within each event, the following items will 
be further analysed: 
1) China’s role and relevance 
2) Response/Action taken by both parties 
3) Implication to the current and future of the relationship 
Afterwards, the findings will be summarized to conceive a conclusion that answer 
the question and prove/disprove the hypothesis.  
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Kim Jong-Un’s Ascension  
The succession of the Kim dynasty had not been a great concern to both 
China and North Korea until the summer of 2008 when Kim Jong-Un’s 
predecessor and father Kim Jong-Il reportedly suffered a serious stroke.  However, 
it was not until 2010 when Kim Jong-Un became a public spot light, and even 
then the succession plan was still shrouded with mystery.  Since May 2010 until 
the death of Kim Jong-Il on December 17, 2011, high level contacts between 
North Korea and China had become a regular event where the younger Kim was 
brought along and formally introduced to the Chinese government.  It was 
believed that there were two intertwining ideologies behind the increasing 
frequency of his participation with his father in high level contacts with Beijing: 1) 
the introduction of Kim Jong-Un to the political aspect of North Korea and 2) to 
seek the blessing from Beijing
2
.  The first point was further illustrated by the 
consecutive appointment of Kim Jong-Un to Daejang (the Korean equivalent to a 
four-star general) and the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission on 
the 27
th
 and 28
th
 of September, 2010 respectively
3
.  The promotion of the military 
inexperienced Kim had been symbolic in solidifying his position in a military-first 
nation, and to begin the consolidation of his power and succession in the 
government.  The second point, the acquisition of consent from Beijing was 
originally intended to pave way to guarantee a more harmonious bilateral 
relationship.  Starting from 1994 and well into the first decade of the 21
st
 century, 
the relationship between North Korea under the Kim Jong-Il and China had been 
strained by Pyongyang’s defiance to Beijing.  Prior the succession, the second half 
                                                          
2Hong Nack Kim, "China-North Korea Relationships after Kim Jong-Il,"International Journal of Korean Studies XVII, no. 
1 (Spring 2013): [Page 23]   
3"North Korean ruling party promotes son of Kim Jong-il." BBC News. N.p., 29 Sept. 2010. Web. 26 May 2015. 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11431415>. 
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of the 21
st
 century had been especially shaky for China due to the two North 
Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, on top of provocations such as the sinking 
of the South Korean naval frigate Cheonan and the shelling of South Korea’s 
Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 which could potentially destabilize the region by 
restarting the Korean War right at China’s backyard.  However, in the late 2010s 
towards his death in December 2011, Kim Jong-Il attempted to repair bridges with 
a frustrated Beijing.  To appease Beijing’s wish for North Korea to follow its 
footsteps in economic transformation, Kim Jong-Il agreed to participate in joint 
economic projects right after the Yeonpyeong crisis.  Furthermore, in his failing 
health, the elder Kim frequently toured China along with his son and also then 
Vice Chairman of National Defense Commission (NDC) Jang Song-Thaek
4
.  Jang 
was believed to be a pro-reform officer who had close ties with Beijing.  As 
China’s priority had been regional stability and conflict prevention, a North Korea 
under the leadership of the western educated Kim Jong-Un with the tutorage of 
Jang was predicted to bring about a new era of moderate foreign policy and 
economic reforms in North Korea.  To China, such notion could have alleviated 
its burden in containing North Korea, hence Beijing’s optimism and recognition 
of Kim Jong-Un as North Korea’s crown prince.   
  With the death of Kim Jong-Il on December 19, 2011, part of Beijing’s 
official message of condolence to Pyongyang was that the North Korean 
population could “unite under the Korean Workers Party and continue to build a 
strong and prosperous socialist state under the leadership of Comrade Kim Jong-
Un”5.  Evidently, the statement itself represented Beijing’s node and approval to 
the younger Kim taking helm of the DPRK.  Then Chinese President Hu Jintao, 
                                                          
4 Kim, "China-North Korea Relationships after Kim Jong-Il," [Page 38] 
5 Ibid. [Page 24] 
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along with high ranking party officials such as current Chinese President Xi 
Jinping visited the North Korean embassy in Beijing to offer their condolences, as 
well as to emphasis its support of the leadership transition as part of its “persistent 
policy” in pursuing the traditional bilateral friendship between the two nations6.  
To the international community, Kim Jong-Un’s official ascension to his throne 
was initiated on December 24, 2011, when North Korean state media bestowed 
him with the title “Supreme Commander”, signifying the military’s backing of the 
succession and the finalization of the power transition.  With the dawn of a new 
era in the DPRK, positive changes were anticipated in the future of the Sino-North 
Korean relationship, as it had been expected Kim Jong-Un would continue to seek 
approval from China to guarantee his legitimacy as his father did during the final 
year of his tenure.  However, coinciding with Kim’s anointment, the NDC had 
also stubbornly emphasized that the DPRK “will not change its nuclear policies” 
and that “inter-Korean relations will not improve”7.  The lingering of such radical 
policies, plus the continuation of North Korea’s military first doctrine was initially 
considered to be the major obstacle in the Sino-North Korean relationship in the 
post Kim Jong-Il era, especially Beijing’s attempt to goad Pyongyang to return to 
the Six Party Talks after DPRK’s departure in 2009.  As China has believed 
communication through the Six Party Talks are believed to be the most efficient 
way to engage and monitor the dynamics on the peninsula, North Korea’s return 
can better insure the stability and constructive dialogues China has longed for.    
 
 
                                                          
6 Ibid.  [Page. 24] 
7 Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: New Challenges in the Post Kim Jong Il Era”, Comparative Connections, 2012.  
[Page 2] 
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Red Flags  
While China attempted to seek a more cooperative DPRK under the helm 
of a different Kim, legacies of the previous generations of Kim radicalism has 
continued to live on.  On December 30, 2011, just less than two weeks after Kim 
Jong-Il’s passing, the NDC had broadcasted that the “foolish politicians around 
the world [should not] expect any change from [the DPRK]” to dissuade any high 
hopes that the Kim Jong-Un dynasty would be drastically different from his 
predecessors or the power transition would bring any changes to the nuclear 
quagmire
8
.  Nonetheless, in January 2012, Pyongyang had agreed to negotiate 
with the US for food aid in return for the suspension of its nuclear program.  
Known as the “2012 Leap Day Agreement”, 240,000 metric tons of nutritional 
assistance would be provided to North Korea in exchange for it to “abide by a 
moratorium on testing and allowing international monitoring of key parts of its 
nuclear program”9.  By the end of February, a more detailed version of the deal 
was drafted, where the DPRK as a sign of good faith would freeze all uranium 
enrichment at its Yongbyon testing ground and agreed to refrain from all forms of 
nuclear and ballistic weaponry tests.  Pyongyang’s initiative and willingness to 
enter into such bargain was widely welcomed by the international community as a 
new beginning of the long awaited and potential long-term demilitarization in the 
region.  For Beijing, the warming of Washington-Pyongyang relations could 
evoke the stability it yearned for, and believed the deal could set the stage for the 
resumption of the Six Party Talks.  In other words, Beijing found the initial 
success from the Leap Day Agreement as an indication of a more cooperative 
                                                          
8 Andrew Salmon, "North Korea Attacks 'Foolish Politicians Around the World,'".  BBC.  December 30, 2011, accessed 
May 26, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8984074/North-Korea-attacks-foolish-
politicians-around-the-world.html.  
9 Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, research report no. 7-5700 (n.p.: n.p., 
2014), [Page 3], accessed May 26, 2015, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pdf. 
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North Korea with a new leader that was believed to deviate from the destructive 
and volatile styles of his predecessors and thus could accommodate for China’s 
call for stability. 
The extension of such gesture by Pyongyang nevertheless was an illusion 
to euphemize its true antics to revive the Kim legacy.  Not long after the Leap 
Day Agreement proposal, the international community, particularly China was 
taken aback by North Korea’s announcement in the subsequent March of its 
intention to launch an earth orbiting satellite, the ‘Kwangmyongsong-3’ via its 
‘Unha-3’ rocket.  The endeavor was widely censured by America and its allies as 
a ruse to test its ballistic missile capability, and Pyongyang had since commenced 
a tug of war with Beijing over DPRK’s claimed “right for a peaceful space 
development” program after its attempt to open up mediation with Pyongyang fell 
on deaf ears
10
.  In fact Beijing was even surprisingly criticized by Pyongyang for 
its alleged “double standard [that] interfered with [DPRK’s] rights”11.  Such bold 
and unusual statement would become epitome to Pyongyang’s upcoming defiance 
towards Beijing. 
 With the proceeding of the (failed) rocket launch on April 13, Pyongyang 
had officially scrapped the Lead Day Agreement with the US, blaming for 
Washington’s “undisguised hostile acts” as according to the Korean Central News 
Agency (KCNA), and with it any hopes of a rational DPRK as Pyongyang sank 
back to its usual radicalism
12
.  Not only had this incident triggered the beginning 
of the cool down in the bilateral relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing, but 
                                                          
10 Kim, "China-North Korea Relationships after," [Page 28] 
11 Ibid.  [Page 28-29] 
12 "DPRK Rejects UNSC's Act to Violate DPRK's Legitimate Right to Launch Satellite," Korea Central News Agency.  
April 17, 2012, accessed May 27, 2015, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201204/news17/20120417-25ee.html. 
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also unveiled Kim Jong-Un’s hidden ambition to uphold North Korea’s status as 
the rogue nation of East Asia.   
2013 Crisis  
Looking back in history, Beijing’s position in North Korea’s nuclear test 
had not been as resounding as China’s regional partners.  When North Korea 
conducted its first nuclear test on 9 October 2006, a shocked China responded by 
voting in favor of United Nation Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolution 1718 that 
“prevented a range of goods from entering or leaving the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and imposeed an asset freeze and travel ban on persons related 
to the nuclear-weapon program”13.  Simultaneously, as a permanent member of 
the Security Council, China also averted the threat of military enforcement against 
DPRK as part of the Resolution with its veto power.  Again during the 
implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874 in the aftermath of North Korea’s 
second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, China had utilized its status as a permanent 
member to minimalize penalties and constrain the scope of sanctions to be 
imposed onto North Korea.   Viewing excessive threats and sanctions to be 
counterproductive that would only suffocate North Korea and its civilians without 
creating an abiding government, China had pushed for more leniency during 
Resolution 1874’s drafting process. Although the finalized framework was passed 
unanimously which authorized governments “to inspect, in accordance with their 
national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, all cargo 
to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports” 14, much 
                                                          
13 "Security Council Condemns Nuclear Test By Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopted 
Resolution 1718 (2006)," United Nations Press Release, October 14, 2006, accessed May 26, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sc8853.doc.htm. 
14  "UN Security Council Resolution 1874, North Korea," Council of Foreign Relations, last modified June 12, 2009, 
accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/un-security-council-resolution-1874-north-korea/p19625. 
12 
 
of the economic and trade restrictions were not clearly defined due to China’s 
influence to dilute the resolution.  For example, while the resolution entitled 
nations to assess and freeze funds and financial accounts suspected to facilitate 
North Korean money laundry activities and weapon trades, it nonetheless 
permitted “humanitarian aid” into the country without establishing what 
constituted as legitimate aid.  Such broad language could be exploited by North 
Korea or its related party to continue its illicit activities under a different manner.   
Preluding to the third nuclear test and its subsequent crisis in 2013, North 
Korea conducted two rocket launches in an attempt to put a satellite in orbit.  
While the launch of the Kwangmyongsong-3 Unit 1 on April 13, 2012 was 
deemed a complete failure due to its collapse in merely seconds after taking off 
and in all sense was somewhat a technological embarrassment, it was successful 
to convey DPRK’s defiance to the international community.  The technical 
disaster only emboldened Pyongyang’s ambition, as a second satellite – Unit 2 of 
the Kwangmyongsong-3 rocket series was launched on December 12, defying 
Beijing’s disapproval and all its attempts to pacify tensions in the region.  The 
launch provoked condemnation internationally as a violation of UNSC Resolution 
1718 and 1874 which inhibited the DPRK from conducting ballistic weapon 
tests
15
.  The UNSC was turned to with the enforcement of North Korea to adhere 
to international law via a new resolution in hope to suppress any future 
provocative and confrontational acts.  However, what proceeded next was an 
unpredicted escalation of tension that almost embroiled the Korean Peninsula into 
warfare.   
                                                          
15  Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, "North Korea’s Second Rocket Launch in 2012," Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, last modified December 5, 2012, accessed May 26, 2015, http://csis.org/publication/north-koreas-second-rocket-
launch-2012. 
13 
 
On January 22, 2013, UNSC Resolution 2087 was passed unanimously to 
condemn the satellite launches and demand North Korea’s compliance to the 
international norm by once again recalling UNSC 1718 and 1874 to refrain from 
all activities related to its ballistic missile program and to abandon all its current 
and in-development nuclear arsenal and cease any future nuclear tests.  In 
reiterating Resolution 1718 and 1874, the UNSC had also emphasized individual 
member states to “exercise enhanced vigilance in this regard, including 
monitoring the activities of their nationals, persons in their territories, financial 
institutions, and other entities organized under their laws (including branches 
abroad) with or on behalf of financial institutions in the DPRK, or of those that act 
on behalf or at the direction of DPRK financial institutions”16.  To remind 
Pyongyang of its ability to enforce sanctions, the Council had also reaffirmed the 
rights to all member states of the United Nations to: 
“…seize and dispose of items consistent with its previous 
resolutions, and clarified that the methods for disposal included, 
but were not limited to, destruction, rendering inoperable, storage 
or transferring to another States other than the originating or 
destination States for disposal.  It further clarified that the 
sanctions banned the transfer of any items if a State involved in 
the transaction has reasonable grounds to believe that a 
designated individual or entity, under the previous resolutions, is 
the originator, intended recipient or facilitator of the item’s 
transfer.  The Council called for enhanced vigilance by Member 
States and directed the relevant sanctions Committee to issue an 
Implementation Assistance Notice in the event a vessel refused to 
allow an inspection authorized by its Flag State or if any vessel 
flagged by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea refused to 
                                                          
16 Resolution 2087 (2013) (United Nations Security Council, 2013), [Page 2], accessed May 26, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2087(2013). 
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be inspected, in line with its obligations.” – UNSC 6904th 
Meeting
17
 
 Through coercion via the aforementioned threats of inspection, suspension and 
embargo, the international community hoped to submit North Korea and curb its 
will from any further rogue endeavors.  However, what the international 
community did not expect was that the satellite launches were only a prologue to 
the true aspiration of Pyongyang which held no intentions to relent its unsettling 
behavior.  
 North Korea soon released a statement on January 24, 2013 that labeled 
Resolution 2087 as the “most dangerous phase of hostile policy toward the DPRK” 
and the UNSC itself a “defunct marionette international body on which no hope 
can be pinned”18.  In what history will remember as the 2013 Korean Crisis, in 
retaliation to the invoking of UNSC Resolution 2087, North Korea initiated its 
third Nuclear Test on 12 February 2013. According to initial reports from South 
Korea’s Ministry of Defense, the blast yield was estimated to be over 7 kilotons, 
and the statistic was later rectified by the University of Science and Technology 
of China to 12.2 kilotons with a margin of error of 3.8 kilotons.
19
.   Subsequently, 
on March 5, DPRK General Kim Yong Chol of the Korean’s People Army 
Supreme Command announced that North Korea “would no longer be bound by 
the Korean War armistice”, followed by alarming statements warning of pre-
emptive nuclear strikes against its perceived aggressors
20
.  Simultaneously, the 
                                                          
17 "Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Technology in Launch by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
in Resolution 2087 (2013)," United Nations Press Release, January 22, 2013, accessed May 26, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc10891.doc.htm. 
"DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution," 18 Korean Central News Agency of DPRK, January 24, 2013, 
accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2013/201301/news24/20130124-10ee.html. 
19
 Miao Zhang and Lianxing Wen, "High-Precision Location and Yield of North Korea's 2013 Nuclear Test," AGU 
Journal 40, no. 12 (June 17, 2013):[Page 2941]. 
20 Jack Kim and Louis Charbonneau, "North Korea Threatens Nuclear Strike, U.N. Expands Sanctions," Reuters.  March 7, 
2013, accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/us-korea-north-attack-
idUSBRE9260BR20130307. 
15 
 
Yongbyong Nuclear Scientific Research Center that was capable to enrich 
plutonium was reopened again in early April after its supposed closure as part of 
the deal agreed on during the Six Party Talks in 2007 to curb North Korea’s 
capability to weaponized fissile materials.  At the peak of tensions, foreign 
diplomatic missions in DPRK were warned by Pyongyang hat the government 
could no longer guarantee their safety and were advised to evacuate by 10 April, 
while the NDC threatened to wage a nuclear war against the US and the nuclear 
annihilation of Japan
21
.  Meanwhile, US military was put on high alert; in 
response to the potential missile threats, ballistic defense networks such as the 
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense equipped warships systems were deployed on Guam and around the 
Korean Peninsula to intercept any missile launches from North Korea, while 
strategic bombers such as the nuclear capable B-2 Spirit stealth bombers were 
included as a show of force to deter against further provocations
22
.  The tension 
waned down by April 15 2013 (conveniently the birthday of DPRK founder Kim 
Il-Sung) when General Chol publically signaled the beginning of the withdrawal 
of North Korea’s military forces23 and Pyongyang’s acceptance for diplomatic 
negotiation after Seoul’s pledge to contribute over US$6 million worth of 
humanitarian aid to “break the vicious cycle” of the never-ending provocations 
and animosity
24
. 
                                                          
21 Haroon Siddique, Justin McCurry, and Ewen MacAskill, "North Korea Warns Embassies Over Safety Following Missile 
Threat," The Guardian.  April 5, 2013, accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/05/north-
korea-missiles-embassy-threats. 
22 "North Korea Threatens Nuclear Strike on Tokyo if Japan Intercepts Missile," Japan Daily.  April 12, 2013, accessed 
May 26, 2015, http://japandailypress.com/north-korea-threatens-nuclear-strike-on-tokyo-if-japan-intercepts-missile-
1226930/. 
23 "North Korea Ready to Develop Relations, Ensure Stability ‘as a Responsible Nuke State’." RT. April 14, 2013, accessed 
May 26, 2015, http://rt.com/news/north-korea-nuke-state-844/. 
24 Sang-Hun Choe, "North Korea’s Dialogue With the South Collapses," New York Times.  June 11, 2013, accessed May 
27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/world/asia/dialogue-between-north-and-south-korea.html?ref=world. 
16 
 
 To China, two of the most alarming elements of the third nuclear test were 
its timing and location; it coincided with the Chinese Lunar New Year festival, 
one of the most celebrated holidays in China where civilians and government 
officials alike would dedicate their time to their families.  More importantly, the 
test was conducted merely two months after Xi Jinping’s ascension as the leader 
of China, whose father belonged to the same revolutionary generation as Kim Il-
Sung.  The endeavor was therefore seen not only perceived as an open defiance to 
China, but a spit in the face to Xi himself.  Indeed, immediately after the test, Xi 
was quoted sternly reprimanding North Korea that “no one should be allowed to 
throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains”25.  In terms 
of location, the Punggye-ri test site which was less than 44 miles from Chinese 
boarder could yield two potentially devastating scenario if any slight error 
occurred, as according to retired PLA General Wang Hongguan.  Besides 
addressing the risk of radioactive leakage into the Chinese side that could 
contaminate underground water plus the surrounding ocean and atmosphere, the 
general also noted that tremors and seismic activities resulted from the explosion 
could lead to devastating earthquakes in the region
26
.  As such, North Korea’s 
nuclear threat to China should not be downplayed; any fallout or accidents could 
easily raze the environment of China’s frontline area.    
 The more startling element to the Chinese politburo however, was 
Pyongyang’s daring defiance to Beijing in order to revamp Kim Jong-Un’s tenure 
as a new era of “Kasong Daeguk” (강성대국), or powerful and prosperous nation 
                                                          
25 Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2013), [Page 
5-6] 
26 Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, "PLA General on “Incalculable Damage” of North Korea’s Nuclear Program," Sino-NK, 
last modified December 20, 2013, accessed May 26, 2015, http://sinonk.com/2013/12/20/pla-general-incalculable-damage/.  
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via its ‘Son’gun’ politics (선군정치)27.  Son’gun, literally translated as military 
priority, has become an ideology deeply imbedded in the minds of the North 
Korean ruling class that its idea of state legitimacy purely conjugates from its 
military capabilities.  While Beijing in the past had downplayed such belief as 
merely paranoia due to the North’s inability to establish security guarantee from 
Washington, the third nuclear test could be perceived as Pyongyang’s desperate 
attempt to recover its legitimacy after the embarrassingly failed satellite launch in 
April 2012.  The second satellite launch, along with the third nuclear test, were 
speculated to compensate for the loss of prestige and to reestablish DPRK as a 
legitimate regional threat that should not be overlooked
28
.  While Beijing had 
attempt to persuade the North’s goal of becoming a Kasong Daeguk via economic 
means, the nuclear test therefore symbolizeed the DPRK’s ambition to deviate 
from China’s guidance to reflect the growing mistrust and disobedience.  As 
Beijing had repeatedly called for rationality from Pyongyang by advocating the 
“three no’s”: no war, no instability, and no nukes, Pyongyang’s insistent to 
associate state prestige with military projection reflects that China is losing its 
leverage to prevent a fourth nuclear test.   
 Hence, unlike its interference with the passing of past Resolutions against 
North Korea, China’s cooperation with the rest of the Security Council in drafting 
and implementing UNSC Resolution 2094 was applauded as a sign that Beijing 
was finally willing to take a more assertive stance in sanctioning North Korea.  
The Resolution itself condemned North Korea for instigating the recent crisis, and 
in addition to calling member states to be vigilant in preventing any activities that 
can contribute to the nuclear and military program of North Korea, it also 
                                                          
27 Kim, "China-North Korea Relationships after," [Page 30-31] 
28 Ibid, Page 30 
18 
 
established heavy financial sanctions against the DPRK.  As announced by the 
United Nations on March 7, 2013: 
“States are directed to prevent the provision of financial services 
or the transfer of any financial or other assets or resources, 
including “bulk cash”, which might be used to evade the 
sanctions.  They are also called on to prohibit in their territories 
the opening of new branches or offices of “DPRK” banks and to 
prohibit such banks from establishing new joint ventures.  
Moreover, in the effort to prevent the direct or indirect supply, 
sale or transfer to or from the Democratic People’s Republic or 
Korea or its nationals of any banned items, States are authorized 
to inspect all cargo within or transiting through their territory 
that has originated in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
or that is destined for that country.  They are to deny permission 
to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if 
they have reasonable grounds to believe the aircraft contains 
prohibited items.” – UNSC 6932nd Meeting29. 
China’s endorsement of the toughest yet sanction on North Korea without much 
revisions as in the past is an ode to the growing frustration amongst the top brass 
in Beijing.  Indeed, the change in tone towards North Korea may actually reflect 
the new direction Xi Jinping is planning to lead China towards.  Unlike his 
predecessor Hu Jintao who had been seen to be rather tolerant towards the North 
and taken a minimalist approach in handling North Korea, Xi and his 
administration are more willing to lay down boundaries, even if it meant to 
cooperate with the US in drafting the Resolution.  To certain extent, China’s 
compromising with the US in drafting Resolution 2094 was perceived as a 
welcoming change in its foreign policy.  The United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations Susan Rice had even termed the Resolution as a “US-China 
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Agreed Resolution”, which hinted the cultivating cooperation between US and 
China under Xi’s tenure in containing the rogue regime30.  Such staunch response 
from China in light of the crisis can be seen as a testament of the new leadership 
of President Xi Jinping that displayed Beijing’s waning tolerance towards its 
protégé. 
 On the other hand, while Beijing has been more assertive in its 
denunciation of North Korea, one should not causally mistake its rhetoric 
toughness for any sudden drastic change of its foreign policy towards North Korea.  
In the words of Adam Segal, Senior Fellow of the Council of Foreign Relations, 
“the idea that the Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is clearly 
wrong”31.  While the cost of maintaining the Kim dynasty has continued to rise 
against the decreasing benefits, Beijing has held onto the belief that the 
consequence of the sudden abandonment of North Korea is still adverse.  In the 
past, China had also strongly condemned North Korea’s nuclear tests as an open 
challenge to dare China in reassessing their relationship, and the foreign ministry 
had even denounced it as a “brazen act”, a phrase which is usually reserved for 
China’s enemies32.  However, just like a father reprimanding a rebellious child, 
China has no intentions to strangle North Korea, but instead to simply punish it in 
order to signal its disapproval to Pyongyang.  As in the past, Beijing’s verbal 
resolve did not coincide with its action in the long run; UNSC Resolution 1718 
and 1874 had gone through multiple revisions from China before their 
implementation.  While Resolution 2094 was smoothly passed with China’s 
support, Beijing has yet to specify a list of luxury items banned from trade with 
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North Korea.  Furthermore, while North Korea has been dependent on China 
regarding to fuel supply (nearly 90% of energy in North Korea comes from 
China), China has yet to use such leverage to control the North even after the 
2013 Crisis
33
.  As China has emphasized on regional stability as its priority, it 
definitely will restrain from asserting sanctions that can lead to North Korea’s 
collapse which in turn can also destabilize the region.  Therefore, China has head-
butted with the US over the idea of stability; while Washington had prioritized 
non-proliferation of North Korea, Beijing has continue to uphold the status quo to 
prevent any disruption to its own national interests 
 Simultaneously, public consensus in China has mostly converge to the 
idea that North Korea has become a cancerous entity that has hindered China’s 
interest in the recent years, and such sentiment has become more vocal thanks to 
the current prevalence use of internet.  In the aftermath of the 2013 Crisis, surges 
of public opinion were recorded criticizing North Korea’s action and supporting 
sanctions against the North
34
.  Scholars and professors noted that China had 
reached a point where “it needs to cut its losses and cut North Korea loose” along 
with bold statements that called for the abandonment of its relationship with North 
Korea to “facilitate unification with South Korea” instead35.  As public opinion 
has been leaning towards the consensus that the North has been taking China’s 
generosity for granted and holds no regards to China’s guidance and interest, the 
number of traditionalists who advocated for the continuing of a beneficial 
relationship with DPRK has significantly dwindled.  On the other hand, studies 
also showed that those who argued for the outright disavowing of North Korea, - 
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strategists have yet to gain prevalence.  Instead as remarked by political think 
tank the International Crisis Group, the majority concentrates in the newly 
emerged centrist camp who seeks the middle ground between traditionalist and 
strategists for practicality reasons.  To summarize, centrists believe that 
“abandoning North Korea is not a realistic choice for China, but [the government 
and the public] do not need to cover up [their displeasure] like [they] did in the 
past”36.  Paralleling the government’s stance, these centrists are open in their 
criticism and delusions of North Korea, yet for tactical reasons will continue to 
maintain its relation albeit under heavy monitor as the total abandonment of North 
Korea will only accelerate the downfall of Pyongyang that can potentially 
destabilize the region and harm China’s regional interests.    
 The 2013 Crisis has been a major concern to China due to its potential 
adverse effect towards the stability of the region.  China’s obsession with regional 
stability has frequently been linked with its own economic development; any 
destabilizing acts caused by North Korea are seen as disruption to China’s 
economic rise, especially if it brings about the involvement of the United States.  
Besides, it has become a common belief among Beijing that stability is the key 
components towards the long term achievement of regional peace and 
denuclearization of the peninsula.  As stated by Daniel Sneider, Stanford’s Asia 
Pacific Research Center’s associate director, “for the Chinese, stability and the 
avoidance of war are top priorities”37.  The geopolitical stability on the Korean 
Peninsula must be maintained to support its economic growth
38
.  Hence, Beijing’s 
decision to assert its support of sanctions against its protégé signified its waning 
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tolerance to the embarrassment caused by its patron state and to reprimand 
Pyongyang for its defiance.  At the same time, China’s hesitance to utilize its 
leverage to exert heavier fines was a reflection of its aim to punish, not strangle 
North Korea in order to avoid revising the geopolitical dynamics of the region.  
To Beijing, the survival of the Kim’s regime in short run is necessary given that 
its sudden collapse could be potentially be more destabilizing and upsetting to 
China’s national interest, especially if its collapse could bring 28,500 US troops 
stationing in South Korea closer to the Chinese border
39
.   
The Scum - Jang Song Taek 
Proclaimed by Pyongyang in 2012, North Korea would achieve the status 
of ‘Kasong Daeguk’ via its continuous advancement of military might and nuclear 
prowess
40
.  At the same time, Kim Jong-Un himself also advocated for a 
developed economy as a building block of a Kasong Daeguk in his first public 
speech on April 15, 2012
41
.  Diverging from its traditional son’gun ideology 
(military first), Kim even unveiled in early 2014 that his policy of 
‘byeongjin’(병진), or ‘parallel progress’ in North Korea’s economic growth in 
conjunction with its nuclear development
42
.  As a testament of its support towards 
North Korea’s sudden concern in economic development, China surged in its 
cooperation with North Korea in the development of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) located at the border region of Ranson along with different projects to 
instigate a momentum in economic shift in North Korea.  Since 2012, the 
coordination of such economic developments with China had become the 
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responsibility of one man – Jang Song-taek, Vice Chairman of the National 
Defense Commission and uncle of Kim Jong-un.  His status as North Korea’s 
liaison with China and the mentor to the young dictator had been perceived as a 
key to lead North Korea to achieve a Chinese style economic reform.  While he 
had earned trust from Beijing in his advocacy of a Chinese style open-door-policy 
in regards to developing North Korea’s economy, his stance as a moderate pro-
Beijing reformer had earned him enemies in the elite inner circle of Pyongyang.  
Soon, his ouster and execution in 2014 had sent ripples of effect in North Korea’s 
social-economic development, but also set off alarms in the Sino-DPRK 
relationship in the modern history.    
 Up till his disappearance from the public in May 2013, Jang was regarded 
as one of the most vital organs within the North Korean leadership, second only to 
Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-Un.  By marriage to Kim Jong-il’s only sister Kim 
Kyong-hui, his status as a family member of the Kim’s had guaranteed him access 
to Pyongyang’s inner circle.  As a confidant of the elder Kim, he was also 
promoted in 2010 to Vice Chairman of the NDC, the de-facto ruling body of 
Pyongyang as part of a succession plan to support the young Kim Jong-Un to 
uphold the Kim dynasty when the elder suffered a stroke in 2008
43
.  After the 
death of Kim Jong-il and with the succession of Kim Jong-un, speculation of 
Jang’s mentorship of the young leader was confirmed with his frequent 
appearance next to Kim and his debuts in a general’s military uniform which 
further solidify his position in the military-first DPRK.  During the reign of Kim 
Jong-Un, his powerbase had been further extended with his visits to China as a 
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liaison to streamline bilateral economic collaboration with North Korea’s main 
ally.   
 Starting from August of 2012, Jang led high profiled tours to China to 
campaign for Chinese cooperation and investments in the North Korean economy; 
amongst his audiences included ex-president Hu Jintao and ex-premier Wen 
Jiabao, whom Jang relayed a message to from Kim Jong-Un that “the DPRK is 
willing to closely cooperate with China to accelerate relevant efforts and push 
forward cooperation in developing economic zones”44.  In particular, a joint 
Chinese-North Korean management committee was established for North Korea’s 
Ranson SEZ along with an investment of US$3 billion in power grids, airports, 
railroads and other infrastructures while discussions were made in potential joint 
projects to create and administer additional SEZs in the Hwangumpyong and 
Wihwa regions of North Korea
45
.  Many investors and companies in China had 
eyed Jang with interest, seeing his pro-Beijing and relatively liberal minded stance 
as guarantees that their risks would be contained.  As revealed by the Chinese 
mining firm Xiyang Group, the North Korean government had confiscated $40 
million worth of assets without warning between 2007 and 2012
46
.  The 
experiences of Xiyang Group had since adversely affected the confidence of 
current and potential investors who deemed North Korea a risky investment 
destination with no guaranteed return.  To demonstrate his assurance to China, 
Jang replaced the notoriously corrupt North Korean foreign investment agency, 
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the Taepung Group, with the Joint Venture and Investment Commission under his 
personal command to regain trust from North Korea’s investors.  In such move, 
Jang had also consolidated all North Korean economic developments and any 
future cooperation, especially with China under his own control thus solidifying 
his power base as the economic mogul of North Korea. 
 However, as early as in November 2012, Kim had begun to sideline Jang 
by inaugurating him as the chairman of North Korea’s State Physical Culture and 
Sports Guidance Commission to shift his responsibility away from politics to 
cultural issues.  Starting from early 2013, Jang was no longer invited to NDCs 
meetings nor was part of the May 2013 envoy to Beijing when his role was 
replaced by his rival and hardliner Choi Ryong Hae
47
.  Yet, Jang’s execution in 
December 8, 2013 had still come as a complete shock to observers in China.  His 
charged crimes, as according to the government controlled Korean Central News 
Agency (KCNA), contained “anti-party, counter-revolutionary acts” that included 
“selling off the land of the Rason economic and trade zone to a foreign country” 
amongst other crimes that led to his branding as a “despicable human scum”48.  
While unconfirmed by Pyongyang, the ‘foreign country’ mentioned in the 
statement was speculated to be China to lambast Jang’s supposed over 
dependency in China to sustain North Korea’s economy.  In other words, the so-
called counter-revolutionary act that Jang has committed was his steadfast push 
for an economic reform with Chinese characteristics.  According to the Daily NK, 
a North Korean watch group based in Seoul, South Korea, Jang’s idea of a 
Chinese styled economic opening, while endorsed by Beijing, did not translate 
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well with Kim Jong-Un’s byeongjin policy which only allowed partial economic 
opening that was heavily monitored by the government
49
.  As claimed by a North 
Korean defector in a Daily NK’s interview, “Jang Sung Taek wanted to pursue a 
Chinese-style reform and opening while enhancing relations with China, but Kim 
Jong Eun and Choi Ryong Hae did not. Kim and Choi probably thought that doing 
that would destroy [North Korean] socialism, and had no option but to purge Jang 
in order to open the way for their vision of a limited opening”50.  Even with Kim’s 
advocacy in highlighting the importance of the economy it the nation’s survival, 
Jang’s vision could not be realized in a still military dominated DPRK.   
In hindsight, the decision to execute Jang correlates to the young dictator’s 
vision of a Kasong Daeguk free from the heavy influence of China.  Against much 
expectation, Kim has pertained the hardline stance of his predecessors who ruled 
North Korea with an iron fist and not hesitate to purge their fracturing aspects 
within the party
51
.  In fact, the younger Kim has been willing to further neglect 
China’s interest in order to consolidate his power.  Embodying the ‘Juche’ (주체) 
philosophy that his two predecessors had led the nation with, Kim Jong-Un 
through the execution could possibly remind the domestic and global audiences of 
the adherence of the North Korean self-persevering guiding principle in his 
leadership style.  As a prominent element of the Juche principle is the attainment 
of charip, or a self-sufficient economy free from any external influence, Jang’s 
invitation of expanding Chinese influence in the North Korean economy could be 
perceived as a blasphemy to the nationalistic philosophy
52
.  On top of that, a 
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concurrence amongst hardliners in Pyongyang has been the refusal to recognize 
China as a socialist country.  To the conservatives, China current capitalistic 
nature should be detested and therefore their intentions in bilateral economic 
developments should be vigilant of
53.  Jang’s accusation of being a counter-
revolutionist therefore was the epitome of such sentiment; his execution therefore 
could be viewed as a testament of Kim’s desire to rid North Korea of China’s 
overbearing shadow and to veer away from Beijing’s influence. 
 In retrospect though, other reasons may also contribute to Jang’s removal 
and eventual execution other than his advocacy of greater bilateral economic 
dependency, in light of the recent events in North Korea.  On April 30
th
, General 
Hyon Yong-Chol of the People’s Armed Force and second highest ranking officer 
of DPRK’s military was reported to be executed with an antiaircraft gun for 
simply “dozing off during military events” and “second guessing Kim’s orders”54.  
Within the same month, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service also reported 
that 15 high ranking officials have been purged in 2015 alone.  As it has yet to be 
confirmed on the crimes of these officials, it could simply be a ruse for Kim to 
remove his political nemesis and consolidate his power.   
 As with China, in light of Jang’s execution, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs disregarded the incident as simply “North Korea’s internal affair” and 
would not deal “any major changes” apart from steps to monitor the situation.  
However, as Jang was referred by ex-President Hu Jintao as someone who “done 
a great deal of work to develop neighborly friendship between China and North 
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Korea”55, it is still uncertain whether Beijing has taken any offense to his removal.  
The radicalism behind his execution though could lead to Beijing to reflect on its 
ability to influence Pyongyang.  With “China’s man in Pyongyang” gone in such 
extreme circumstance, it is possible that Beijing’s grip on Kim Jong-un would 
continue to loosen which will affect the status quo of the region
56
.   
Red April 
Starting in April, 2015, the international perception of the North Korean 
threat has changed for the worse.  While military analysts had doubted the 
capability of North Korean’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
technology, such as the ability to mount a nuclear warhead on a missile, the head 
of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and US 
Northern Command Admiral Bill Gortney announced on April 7
th
 that Pyongyang 
has recently achieved a breakthrough.  Assessing the KN-08 ICBM which 
existence was publically acknowledged in 2012 and was initially downplayed to 
be just a mock-up model at that time, Adm. Gortney warned that the missile has 
become an operational threat that can even carry nuclear weapons to the US
57
.  
Quoting the Admiral, “[NORAD]’s assessment is that they have the ability to put 
a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the [U.S.] homeland”58.  Intelligence 
also pinpointed that the threat has been further amplified by the KN-08’s nature as 
a road-mobile missile which deployment will potentially be difficult track and 
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locate, further intensifying the fog of war around the peninsula shall hostility 
break out again.   
The Admiral’s admittance of North Korea’s newfound capability to 
miniaturize a warhead was further corresponded by a report released by China’s 
top nuclear experts on April 22 regarding the DPRK’s nuclear development.  The 
highlight of the report detailg that North Korea may already have 20 nuclear 
warheads by 2015 and the number will double by next year due to the North’s 
improvement in its production of fissile materials and weapon grade uranium.  
The figure exceeds the US estimates based on John Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies (SAIS) which early ranged the number to be 
between 10-16.    Putting the threat in perspectives, Wall Street Journal released 
the following graph to put the threat in perspective within the next 5 years
59
: 
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As stated, by 2016, the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the DPRK will 
double the current amount to 40 according to the Chinese statistics.   If the current 
trend remains unchallenged, it is predicted by the nuclear experts that the DPRK 
will surpass 75 nuclear warheads by 2020, outstripping SAIS’s conservative 
estimate of 50 (while the SAIS has also warned a North Korea left uncheck can 
potentially possess up to 100 warheads by 2020 in the worst-case-scenario)
60
.  
The release of such report also indicates that China, being North Korea’s biggest 
investor and donor has changed its opinion regarding the DPRK from 
downplaying the threat it projects to aligning and sharing Washington’s concerns.  
The shift in perspective may also reflect Beijing’s strained grip on Pyongyang 
whose negligence to Chinese advice has threatened to destabilize the region.   
While Beijing’s foreign affairs and defense ministries has yet to provide 
further comment on the report as of July 2015, its view on the DPRK’s threat 
level has been further escalated by a missile test carried out by the North Korean 
Navy in early May.  Unlike the previous launches, the recent missile test 
successfully ejected a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) into the air, 
demonstrating the exponential advancement of North Korea’s ballistic 
technology
61
.   In comparison to nuclear weapons delivered by strategic bombers 
or ground based launchers, SLBM is the most mobile and undetectable factor of 
the nuclear triad.  In other words, North Korea’s recent demonstration can 
potentially be a testimonial to DPRK’s “credible second strike capability [that is] 
difficult to defend against”, as quoted by the deputy project director for North 
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East Asia at the International Crisis Group Daniel Pinkston
62
.  Adjoining back to 
the warning issued by Admiral Gortney, with the North’s ability to miniaturize a 
nuclear warhead to fit onto a ballistic missile, Kim Jong-Un’s vision of having a 
“time bomb which will go off on the backs of [North Korea’s] hostile enemies at 
any time”63 may materialize sooner than expected.  To Pyongyang, the capability 
to utilize SLBMs as an unpredictable deterrent to ward off any forms of military 
pressure can potentially be the pinnacle in its dangerous endeavour to exemplify 
its resolve in its continuous defiance towards the international community, 
particularly to both Beijing and Washington.    
Stakes have become higher for Beijing as the situation progress.  While 
the continuously unchecked progression of nuclear development in North Korea 
may destabilize the region and expand proliferation of nuclear materials, Beijing 
will also be considering how Washington and Tokyo will react to the elevated 
threat level from North Korea.  Any increment in military expansion by the US 
and Japan in the name of containing North Korea will be undesirable to China, 
especially with the recent disputes over territorial claims in the South China Sea 
which Beijing has viewed Japan’s increased military spending and US’s increased 
involvement as to attempt encircling of China.  To prevent such scenario from 
taking form, Beijing has acted in accordance with its response during the 2013 
Crisis by inviting an US envoy to the capital and agreed to cooperate with the US 
to accelerate on the de-nuclearizing process on May 23
64
.  In response to the 
SLBM test which violated UNSC Resolutions in prohibiting the North from 
conducting such tests, Beijing also agreed to refrain from hindering any passing of 
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sanctions in upcoming UNSC meetings.   From issuing warnings that overtakes 
US’s estimates to its cooperation with Washington over the current situation, such 
acts may reflect Beijing’s days of undermining Pyongyang’s resolve and 
capability is over, and that North Korea may actually become a legitimate threat 
to China.  
Simultaneously, it is too early to claim that Beijing’s perception of North 
Korea totally aligns to that of the US.  After all, Pyongyang’s current distrust of 
Beijing is far from the hostility and animosity it holds towards Washington.  In 
other words, due to the different threat level imposed towards them, Beijing does 
not share Washington’s sense of urgency in curbing the current trend of North 
Korea’s nuclear expansion.  Furthermore, it is vital to recall that the preserving of 
regional stability to cope with China’s development has remained the priority for 
Beijing.  Hence, any condemnations from Beijing can potentially aimed only to 
goad Pyongyang in respecting the regional status quo in order to uphold China’s 
own national interest in Asia Pacific.  While Beijing agrees to cooperate with 
Washington in upholding peace and non-proliferation in the Korean Peninsula, its 
sentiment does not necessarily translate to drastic actions to further strain the 
survivability of the Kim regime and upset regional status quo.  As history has 
demonstrated, Pyongyang’s radicalism has remained unchanged, if not worsened 
despite strong and harsh warnings from Beijing.  In conclusion, one therefore 
should be cautious in linking Beijing’s actions and intentions as to not 
misinterpret Beijing’s recent frustrations are signs of any sudden abandonment of 
Pyongyang.   
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Analysis  
Paralleling US President Barrack Obama’s “red line” set upon Bashar al-
Assad’s regime in August 2012 in its utilization of chemical weapons during the 
ongoing Syrian Civil War, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi also declared a red 
line has been drawn by China during a press conference held by the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) on March 8, 2014.  Calling its neighbor to exercise 
restraints in its nuclear and military testings, Wang also laid out that China will 
not permit the outbreak of “war or instability on the Korean peninsula"65.  At the 
same time, he also warned that any confrontations in the region will only lead to 
hostility and disaster, a message which could be silently aiming towards nations to 
act responsibly without instigating any further provocations or tensions.   As 
stated by former White House’s National Security Council Director of Asian 
Affairs Victor Cha, further tests can “prompt countries like Japan to consider, at a 
minimum, more active missile defense cooperation with the United States, and at 
a maximum, greater militarization on their own”66.  In summary, Beijing’s 
topmost priority in the peninsular is, and has always been, ‘stability’.  As 
exemplified by the three major international headlines set by North Korea since 
Kim Jong-Un’s ascension to his iron throne, Pyongyang’s venture in achieving the 
status of Kasong Daeguk by threatening to destabilize the region has been 
contradicting China’s goal to smoothly rise as a regional hegemon and global 
power in a stabilized region free from contentious environment exerted by any 
parties.   
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Analyzing Beijing’s stance since the 2013 Crisis, it is has become apparent 
that if North Korea is left unchecked, stability may no longer equate status quo, 
creating a dilemma the Xi administration will have to face as part of China’s 
growth management.  By cooperating more so with the international community 
in sanctioning the DPRK without interference like it did under previous 
administration, Beijing under Xi has reflected its diminishing patience and boiling 
frustrations towards the DPRK for inhibiting China’s own developments.  Along 
with the warning it issued in April regarding North Korea’s nuclear stockpile and 
its support behind potential sanctions against the North’s recent SLBM test, these 
examples demonstrate that the DPRK has become more of a nuisance rather than 
an effective buffer zone China desired it to be.  In comparison to his predecessor 
Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has a more heightened concern over the denuclearization 
process of North Korea.  Xi’s apparently increased vocalization of North Korea’s 
nuclear issue has displayed that stability and non-proliferation aren’t separate 
entities but interlocked variables that China should focus on simultaneously.  On 
the other hand, with China’s long term goal to transition from the irrelevant “lips 
and teeth” relationship between the two Cold War allies to a regular ‘state-to-state 
relationship’67, the survivability of Kim’s regime will maintain a priority in 
China’s foreign policies.  Being North Korea’s biggest energy and aid provider, 
China has been hesitant in flexing its muscle and utilizing its leverage to 
discipline its protégé.  By cutting off the lifeline to North Korea, Beijing feared 
that rather than guaranteeing a disciplined and moderate regime, it will instead 
hasten the collapse of the DPRK and tipping the status quo against China’s favor.  
In short run, Beijing has expected that the sudden collapse of the Kim regime will 
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spill over into China’s north western region in the form of a massive influx of 
refugees crossing the Yalu River into the Dan-dong district
68
.  Researches have 
warned that shall such scenario occur, a Xingjian-esque ethnicity crisis may 
potentially be spawned where Chinese authorities are facing a destructive 
minority movement staged by the Uyghur population.  Beijing therefore may find 
the collapse of Pyongyang a precursor to a domestic problem that can lead to its 
northwestern region embroiled in a separatist movement with the potential scale 
similar to that of Xingjian.  Overall, while Xi has taken a more vocal stance 
against the Kim regime, China has yet to become the ‘responsible stakeholder’ the 
international community has expected it to be
69, as China’s dilemma has 
prevented it from moving an inch forward to either direction. 
At the same time, the US factor has remained strong in China’s 
management of North Korea.  According to an interview with Professor Daniel 
Lynch of the University of Southern California’s School of International Relations, 
the Xi administration has been assertive in responding to US’s presence in the 
Asia Pacific
70
.  While the situation in the Korean Peninsula has offered Beijing 
opportunities to cooperate with the US to create a mutually beneficial 
environment, the greater goal of China is actually to become the regional 
hegemon by undermining US’s pivot in Asia, an element that Beijing perceived as 
an attempt to encircle and contain China’s rise.  Even Pyongyang’s antics have 
been a nuisance to Beijing, North Korea nonetheless can be exploited to distract 
both the US’s plan to soundly project its dominance in the region.  As noted by 
Lynch, the unveiling of Beijing’s estimation of North Korea’s nuclear stockpile 
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was not a friendly warning to the US, but to assert that US’s aggressive effort in 
denuclearizing the Peninsula has been counterproductive.  In other words, in the 
context of China’s rivalry with the US, North Korea’s unpredictable antics can be 
leveraged by Beijing in subverting of Washington’s policies in Asia.   
As with Pyongyang, Kim Jong-Un’s continuously reckless and 
provocative acts may signal the dwindling of Beijing’s influence.  While China 
seeks stability, North Korea responds with defiance.  From the satellite launches 
to submarine missile tests, North Korea has been acting with little regards to 
China’s goal of regional stability.  With the death of Kim Jong-Il in 2011, Beijing 
thought the new western educated leader would unleash a series of normalized 
cooperation and democratic reforms
71
.  The 2013 nuclear test and subsequent 
crisis may even have startled China with the extent the new leader will to take to 
resist Beijing’s guidance, leading to the inception of China’s Red Line.  Since 
then, Kim Jong-Un has no longer become the harbinger of change that China can 
rely to bring a new era in North Korea, but an irrational dictator who upholds the 
family legacy by marrying the traditional North Korean juche and son’gun 
ideologies with his Kasong Daeguk vision.  The execution of his uncle, a blood 
kin and a pro-Beijing reformist has solidify the opinion that Kim not only has 
been willing to drive the wedge further between the bilateral relationship to 
consolidate his power, but also his ambition to stamp out any influence from 
Beijing from the top brass in Pyongyang.       
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Regional Implications 
During June 2013, South Korean President Park Geun-hye visited 
Tsinghua University at Beijing, the alma mater of President Xi Jinping.  In her 
speech to the faculties and student, the president, in fluent mandarin, advocated 
for “trust politik – mutual trust between leaders and their people [that] lead to 
good bilateral relations”72.  In a surprising turn of events, the Chinese president 
visited his counterpart in Seoul on 3
rd
 July 2014 while a trip to Pyongyang has yet 
to materialize.  As if relaying a message to Pyongyang, Xi’s visit to Seoul could 
reflect its perception of South Korea as a more trustworthy and prospective 
regional partner in China’s quest to insure regional stability. Coined the meeting 
as “trust-building process”, the two presidents emphasized an era of mutual 
economic cooperation and the bolstering of diplomatic relationship between the 
two
73
.  Though the meeting did not mention North Korea directly, both Xi and 
Park also called for cooperation to guarantee stability in a nuclear free peninsula.  
Xi’s courting of Park’s regime is a reflection of Beijing’s plan to introduce an 
alternative solution in the Korean Peninsula.  Perceiving Park’s approaches as 
more flexible than Washington’s hawkish manner to achieve denuclearization and 
non-proliferation, Beijing has found Seoul’s motives in seeking peace with both 
security and economy factors correlates to its own definition of stability in the 
region.  Furthermore, China can potentially be hedging for a contingency plan in 
case of Seoul’s control of a unified peninsula after the collapse of the Kim’s 
regime.  As China has dreaded such scenario will push US troops in Korea in 
closer proximity to China, Beijing may therefore seeks to establish a positive and 
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stronger relationship with Seoul now to prevent any antagonistic sentiment 
influenced by the US in such scenario.  By creating a stronger foundation to 
prepare for higher levels of mutual cooperation in the future, Beijing can at least 
pave for a neutral Seoul who won’t be enlisted by the US in its containment of 
China.   
Potentially isolated by its closest ally (or what it referred to as “turncoat 
and enemy” as stated in the beginning), Pyongyang has recently been given the 
opportunity to turn to its other ex-Cold War mentor – Russia.  With mounting 
hostility with the West over Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis, President Vladimir 
Putin extended his invitation to Kim Jong-Un to Russia’s 70th anniversary of 
World War II in April 2015
74
.  As the celebration was boycotted by western 
leaders, the invitation was part of Putin’s “Screw-You Policy” as coined by North 
Korea expert Nicholas Eberstadt
75
.   As both sanction-ridden nations were 
wrestling to defy against the international community particularly the West, a 
surge in the Kim-Putin alliance could be symbolic in reaffirming their persistent 
provocations and refusal to adhere to any pressures in their struggles.  As 2015 
also marks the “Year of Friendship” in Russia that promotes greater trade and 
investments between the two, such can also reduce the DPRK’s dependency in 
China’s economic aids and potentially becoming another country North Korea can 
rely on in the UNSC to veto future sanctions set up the western permanent 
members
76
.    While Kim ended up abstaining his attendance due to “internal 
issues” in the last minute (possibly related to the execution 15 party officials), it is 
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certain that there will be more engagements between the two outcast states in the 
near future.      
Conclusion  
Beijing’s long term goal is a stabilized, preferably denuclearized Korean 
Peninsula free of US troops and led by a government that is friendly or at least 
neutral to China
77
.   In its handling of North Korea, China has been slow and 
cautious as it has been locked in a dilemma due to its perception of itself being the 
DPRK’s lifeline.  Furthermore, any drastic changes to Beijing’s position will only 
distract the other current priorities of the Xi administration which include the 
ongoing anti-corruption campaign within China’s top brass and the projection of 
power in the South China Sea via the continuous construction of man-made 
islands to serve as “unsinkable aircraft carriers” and other military usages78.  Even 
in the event of a fourth nuclear test, Beijing’s action will not deviate much from 
its responses to the 2013 missile test.  Therefore, all China can do is to continue 
advocating for dialogues, especially through the resumption of the Six-Party-
Talks as the best way to deescalate any rise in hostility.   
However, with the current Kim regime continuously defiant to China’s 
wishes, it seemed that the revival of the Talk will continue to be adjourned.  
Unlike Iran, there are no signs from within Pyongyang that Kim Jong-Un or the 
NDC are willing to undergo revolutionary changes to freeze its nuclear program 
as demonstrated by the moderate Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.  As 
mentioned in the analysis, while Beijing wants to establish a normal state-to-state 
relationship with Pyongyang, Kim’s regime has been resistant to such change and 
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will not accept a Kasong Daeguk with Chinese characteristics via international 
legitimacy and economic reforms.  Simultaneously, Beijing also believes that any 
sudden change to the status quo in the Sino-DPRK relations will accelerate the 
collapse of Kim’s regime.  Recalling the hypothesis, “though frustrated China 
nonetheless will not cease its relation with the DPRK as it still needs the buffer 
zone between them and a US allied South Korea”.  This Capstone Project 
therefore has proven the statement to be partially correct; China will maintain the 
current relation not chiefly to create a Cold War styled satellite state, but to 
prevent any disruption to the stability that can stall China’s rise in the region.  
Even with the execution of the only man Beijing could trust in Pyongyang and the 
alarming acceleration of its nuclear program, Beijing has been reluctant to 
forcefully pressure Pyongyang for reform other than vocalizing its frustration.  
Hence, China’s centrist standpoint can be best described with the Chinese idiom 
“tóushŭjqì” (投鼠忌器), which means stoning a mouse but concerned about 
breaking the pottery nearby.  Putting in context in China’s situation, while a 
baffled Beijing desires to tame and discipline North Korea, it also perceives the 
Korean Peninsula to be a fragile vase and fears that any revision any country 
exerts upon Pyongyang can destabilize the region
79
.  To the Xi administration, 
hedging against North Korea primarily means the pacification of both the 
international community and also Kim’s regime from any exorbitant courses that 
can upset the status quo.   
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